Ihre Suche

Seit 70 Jahren beschäftigt sich das international bekannte Institut für Grenzgebiete der Psychologie und Psychohygiene in Freiburg mit anomalen Phänomenen unserer Alltagswelt wie Gedankenübertragung, Nahtoderfahrungen oder veränderten Bewusstseinszuständen. Es geht nicht allein um die klassischen Felder der Parapsychologie, wie Spukerscheinungen, Telepathie oder Hellsehen, sondern um die Erforschung von bisher nur unzureichend verstandenen Phänomenen an den Grenzen unseres Wissens. Forscher aus verschiedenen Disziplinen beschreiben in leicht verständlicher Form ihre Forschung am Institut.

Boredom is an everyday experience during uneventful situations and while waiting. Such situations are typically described as unpleasant since oneself becomes the focus of awareness, and the subjective duration expands. Self-control is an individual trait that helps to cope with unpleasant situations. Hardly any systematic studies exist on real waiting situations where people's boredom and subjective time experience are assessed in relation to self-control. Therefore, we assessed 99 participants who first filled out self-report questionnaires on emotional and metacognitive control, the Scale for Experiencing Emotions (SEE) and the Temporal Metacognition Scale (TMCS). After giving a fake reason for why they had to wait, participants were shut in an empty room alone for 7.5 minutes and afterwards asked to report their impressions regarding the experienced time and reactions to the situation. Boredom was associated with the feeling of time passing more slowly and more frequent thoughts about time. The propensity to self-regulate was related to less awareness of time and to lower levels of boredom. Mediation analyses revealed that the level of boredom mediates the relationships between self-regulation processes and time perception. The results provide new insights into the association between time perception and boredom as states in a real situation and self-regulation as a trait.

When a voluntary action is causally linked with a sensory outcome, the action and its consequent effect are perceived as being closer together in time. This effect is called intentional binding. Although many experiments were conducted on this phenomenon, the underlying neural mechanisms are not well understood. While intentional binding is specific to voluntary action, we presumed that preconscious brain activity (the readiness potential, RP), which occurs before an action is made, might play an important role in this binding effect. In this study, the brain dynamics were recorded with electroencephalography (EEG) and analyzed in single-trials in order to estimate whether intentional binding is correlated with the early neural processes. Moreover, we were interested in different behavioral performance between meditators and non-meditators since meditators are expected to be able to keep attention more consistently on a task. Thus, we performed the intentional binding paradigm with 20 mindfulness meditators and compared them to matched controls. Although, we did not observe a group effect on either behavioral data or EEG recordings, we found that self-initiated movements following ongoing negative deflections of slow cortical potentials (SCPs) result in a stronger binding effect compared to positive potentials, especially regarding the perceived time of the consequent effect. Our results provide the first direct evidence that the early neural activity within the range of SCPs affects perceived time of a sensory outcome that is caused by intentional action.

Intuitively, being aware of one's inner processes to move should be crucial for the control of voluntary movements. However, research findings suggest that we are not always aware of the processes leading to movement execution. The present study investigated induced first-person access to inner processes of movement initiation and the underlying brain activities which contribute to the emergence of voluntary movement. Moreover, we investigated differences in task performance between mindfulness meditators and non-meditators while assuming that meditators are more experienced in attending to their inner processes. Two Libet-type tasks were performed; one in which participants were asked to press a button at a moment of their own decision, and the other one in which participants' attention was directed towards their inner processes of decision making regarding the intended movement which lead them to press the button. Meditators revealed a consistent readiness potential (RP) between the two tasks with correlations between the subjective intention time to act and the slope of the early RP. However, non-meditators did not show this consistency. Instead, elicited introspection of inner processes of movement initiation changed early brain activity that is related to voluntary movement processes. Our findings suggest that compared to non-meditators, meditators are more able to access the emergence of negative deflections of slow cortical potentials (SCPs), which could have fundamental effects on initiating a voluntary movement with awareness.

Research findings link rolandic beta-band activity to voluntary movements, but a linkage with the decision time to move remains unknown. We found that beta-band (16-28Hz) activity shortly before the movement onset is relevant for the decision time to move: the more pronounced the decrease in beta-band synchronization, the earlier the subjective experience of the decision to move. The linkage was relevant regarding 'decision', but not regarding 'intention' timing that has been often applied in the study of free will. Our findings suggest that oscillatory neural activity in the beta-band is an important neural signature pertaining to the subjective experience of making a decision to move.

While the contingent negative variation (CNV) has been the subject of extensive research over the last fifty years, the maximum duration during which such cortical negativity can be maintained has, to the best of our knowledge, never been systematically explored. Participants were presented with the classic S1-S2 paradigm task, where a warning stimulus (S1) acts as a cue for the appearance of an imperative stimulus (S2). A fast motor response was required upon S2 arrival. Inter-stimulus intervals (ISIs) of 2.5, 5, 7.5 and 10 s duration were presented in blocked fashion. Data was analysed using both EEG referenced to linked mastoids and the current source density (CSD) technique, which maximizes the cortical origin of the measured voltage. Mean late CNV (lCNV) amplitude was found to be significantly higher for fast reaction time (RT) trials when CSD data was split according to the median into 'fast' and 'slow' RT halves. Post-hoc comparisons showed that this RT effect was particularly strong for the 10 s condition. This may be explained by the lack of an lCNV component and thus of cortical negativity prior to S2 in the 10 s condition. Our results suggest that intervals of a duration between 7.5 and 10 s represent the upper boundary during which the lCNV component can be elicited.

The readiness potential is an ongoing negativity in the EEG preceding a self-initiated movement by approximately 1.5s. So far it has predominantly been interpreted as a preparatory signal with a causal link to the upcoming movement. Here a different hypothesis is suggested which we call the selective slow cortical potential sampling hypothesis. In this review of recent research results we argue that the initiation of a voluntary action is more likely during negative fluctuations of the slow cortical potential and that the sampling and averaging of many trials leads to the observed negativity. That is, empirical evidence indicates that the early readiness potential is not a neural correlate of preconscious motor preparation and thus a determinant of action. Our hypothesis thereafter challenges the classic interpretation of the Libet experiment which is often taken as proof that there is no free will. We furthermore suggest that slow cortical potentials are related to an urge to act but are not a neural indicator of the decision process of action initiation.

Floatation-REST (Reduced Environmental Stimulation Therapy) minimizes stimulation of the nervous system by immersing subjects in an environment without sound or light while they effortlessly float in thermoneutral water supersaturated with Epsom salt. Here we investigated the relationship between altered states of consciousness (ASC) and its association with the affective changes induced by Floatation-REST. Using a within-subject crossover design, 50 healthy subjects were randomized to 60 min of Floatation-REST or 60 min of Bed-REST (an active control condition that entailed lying supine on a warm waterbed in a dark and quiet room). Following Floatation-REST, subjects felt significantly more relaxed, less anxious, and less tired than after Bed-REST. Floatation-REST also induced significantly more pronounced ASC characterized by the dissolution of body boundaries and the distortion of subjective time. The loss of body boundaries mediated the loss of anxiety, revealing a novel mechanism by which Floatation-REST exerts its anxiolytic effect.

This study examined the effects of meditative states in experienced meditators on present-moment awareness, subjective time, and self-awareness while assessing meditation-induced changes in heart-rate variability and breathing rate. A sample of 22 experienced meditators who practiced meditation techniques stressing awareness of the present moment (average 20 years of practice) filled out subjective scales pertaining to sense of time and the bodily self and accomplished a metronome task as an operationalization of present-moment awareness before and after a 20 min meditation session (experimental condition) and a 20 min reading session (control condition) according to a within-subject design. A mixed pattern of increased sympathetic and parasympathetic activity was found during meditation regarding heart-rate measures. Breathing intervals were prolonged during meditation. Participants perceived their body boundaries as less salient during meditation than while reading the story; they also felt time passed more quickly and they paid less attention to time during meditation. No significant differences between conditions became apparent for the metronome task. This is probably the first quantitative study to show how the experience of time during a meditation session is altered together with the sense of the bodily self.

During the observation of an ambiguous figure our perception alternates between mutually exclusive interpretations, although the stimulus itself remains unchanged. The rate of these endogenous reversals has been discussed as reflecting basic aspects of endogenous brain dynamics. Recent evidence indicates that extensive meditation practice evokes long-term functional and anatomic changes in the brain, also affecting the endogenous brain dynamics. As one of several consequences the rate of perceptual reversals during ambiguous figure perception decreases. In the present study we compared EEG-correlates of endogenous reversals of ambiguous figures between meditators and non-meditating controls in order to better understand timing and brain locations of this altered endogenous brain dynamics. A well-established EEG paradigm was used to measure the neural processes underlying endogenous perceptual reversals of ambiguous figures with high temporal precision. We compared reversal-related ERPs between experienced meditators and non-meditating controls. For both groups we found highly similar chains of reversal-related ERPs, starting early in visual areas, therewith replicating previous findings from the literature. Meditators, however, showed an additional frontal ERP signature already 160 ms after stimulus onset (Frontal Negativity). We interpret the additional, meditation-specific ERP results as evidence that extensive meditation practice provides control of frontal brain areas over early sensory processing steps. This may allow meditators to overcome phylogenetically evolved perceptual and attentional processing automatisms.

BACKGROUND: Distant intention research refers to experiments in which a distant interaction between two persons is assessed that precludes conventional communication. In these experiments the intention of one person is varied systematically while the effect of this variation is assessed in the remote other person. AIMS: Our study aimed at improving effect sizes by participant selection based on a screening test and by including experienced meditators. METHOD: 66 participants with meditation experience participated in a forced-choice psi-test as a screening test. Participants with similar performance were invited as pairs for a distant intention experiment. The task of the helpee was to focus attention on a candle and to indicate lapses in attention by pressing a button. In a within-subject design the task of the remote helper was either to assist the helpee in this effort or to engage in a distraction task. Electrodermal activity (EDA) and button presses from the helpee served as dependent variables. RESULTS AND CONCLUSION: Participants' performance in the psi-screening test did not exceed chance expectations. In the distant intention experiment with 30 sessions no distant intention effect could be found in the prespecified analyses. The results in the psi-screening test were not correlated with performance in the main experiment. However, we found a large negative correlation between self-reported exceptional experiences of the helper and two EDA variables, namely skin conductance level and number of non-specific skin conductance responses. This correlation, if replicated, can hardly be explained without the assumption of a distant interaction.

It has been repeatedly shown that specific brain activity related to planning movement develops before the conscious intention to act. This empirical finding strongly challenges the notion of free will. Here, we demonstrate that in the Libet experiment, spontaneous fluctuations of the slow electro-cortical potentials (SCPs) account for a significant fraction of the readiness potential (RP). The individual potential shifts preceding self-initiated movements were classified as showing a negative or positive shift. The negative and positive potential shifts were analyzed in a self-initiated movement condition and in a no-movement condition. Comparing the potential shifts between both conditions, we observed no differences in the early part of the potential. This reveals that the apparently negative RP emerges through an unequal ratio of negative and positive potential shifts. These results suggest that ongoing negative shifts of the SCPs facilitate self-initiated movement but are not related to processes underlying preparation or decision to act.

The belief in free will has been frequently challenged since Benjamin Libet published his famous experiment in 1983. Although Libet's experiment is highly dependent upon subjective reports, no study has been conducted that focused on a first-person or introspective perspective of the task. We took a neurophenomenological approach in an N=1 study providing reliable and valid measures of the first-person perspective in conjunction with brain dynamics. We found that a larger readiness potential (RP) is attributable to more frequent occurrences of self-initiated movements during negative deflections of the slow cortical potentials (SCP). These negative deflections occur in parallel with an inner impulse reported by an expert meditator which may in turn lead to a voluntary act. We demonstrate in this proof-of-principle approach that the first-person perspective obtained by an expert meditator in conjunction with neural signal analysis can contribute to our understanding of the neural underpinnings of voluntary acts.

Recent research suggests that bodily signals and interoception are strongly related to our sense of time. Mindfulness meditators train to be aware of their body states and therefore could be more accurate at interval timing. In this study, n = 22 experienced mindfulness meditators and n = 22 matched controls performed both, an acoustic and a visual duration reproduction task of 8, 14, and 20 s intervals, while heart rate and skin conductance were continuously assessed. In addition, participants accomplished a heart beat perception task and two selective attention tasks. Results revealed no differences between meditators and controls with respect to performance in duration reproduction or attentional capacities. Additionally no group difference in heart beat perception scores was found. Across all subjects, correlational analyses revealed several associations between performance in the duration reproduction tasks and psychophysiological changes, the latter being also related to heart beat perception scores. Furthermore, former findings of linearly increasing cardiac periods and decreasing skin conductance levels during the auditory duration estimation task (Meissner and Wittmann, 2011) could be replicated, and these changes could also be observed during a visual duration reproduction task. In contrast to our earlier findings, the heart beat perception test was not related with timing performance. Overall, although experienced meditators did not differ from matched controls with respect to duration reproduction and interoceptive awareness, this study adds significantly to the emerging view that time perception is related to autonomic regulation and awareness of body states.

This study is based on the relationship between meditation, the present moment, and psychophysiology. We employed the metronome task to operationalize the extension of the present moment. A pre-post longitudinal study was conducted. The performance in the metronome task was compared before and after the interventions (meditation, story). The aim was to assess whether physiological changes (heart, breathing) during meditation influence the temporal-integration (TI) of metronome beats. Mindfulness meditators either meditated (n = 41) or listened to a story (n = 43). The heart and breathing activity were recorded during the intervention and compared to a resting-state condition. By applying path analyses we found that meditation led to an increase of the duration of integration intervals at the slowest metronome frequency (inter-stimulus interval, ISI = 3 s). After meditation, the higher the heart-rate variability (i.e., the root mean square of successive differences, RMSSD), the longer the duration of integration intervals at the fastest frequency (ISI = 0.33 s). Moreover, the higher the breathing rate during meditation, the greater the integration of intervals at ISI = 1 s. These findings add evidence to meditation-induced changes on the TI of metronome beats and the concept of the embodiment of mental functioning.

The minimal neural correlate of the conscious state, regardless of the neural activity correlated with the ever-changing contents of experience, has still not been identified. Different attempts have been made, mainly by comparing the normal waking state to seemingly unconscious states, such as deep sleep or general anesthesia. A more direct approach would be the neuroscientific investigation of conscious states that are experienced as free of any specific phenomenal content. Here we present serendipitous data on content-free awareness (CFA) during an EEG-fMRI assessment reported by an extraordinarily qualified meditator with over 50,000 h of practice. We focused on two specific cortical networks related to external and internal awareness, i.e., the dorsal attention network (DAN) and the default mode network (DMN), to explore the neural correlates of this experience. The combination of high-resolution EEG and ultrafast fMRI enabled us to analyze the dynamic aspects of fMRI connectivity informed by EEG power analysis. The neural correlates of CFA were characterized by a sharp decrease in alpha power and an increase in theta power as well as increases in functional connectivity in the DAN and decreases in the posterior DMN. We interpret these findings as correlates of a top-down-initiated attentional state excluding external sensory stimuli and internal mentation from conscious experience. We conclude that the investigation of states of CFA could provide valuable input for new methodological and conceptual approaches in the search for the minimal neural correlate of consciousness.

Experienced meditators typically report that they experience time slowing down in meditation practice as well as in everyday life. Conceptually this phenomenon may be understood through functional states of mindfulness, i.e., by attention regulation, body awareness, emotion regulation, and enhanced memory. However, hardly any systematic empirical work exists regarding the experience of time in meditators. In the current cross-sectional study, we investigated whether 42 experienced mindfulness meditation practitioners (with on average 10 years of experience) showed differences in the experience of time as compared to 42 controls without any meditation experience matched for age, sex, and education. The perception of time was assessed with a battery of psychophysical tasks assessing the accuracy of prospective time judgments in duration discrimination, duration reproduction, and time estimation in the milliseconds to minutes range as well with several psychometric instruments related to subjective time such as the Zimbardo Time Perspective Inventory, the Barratt Impulsivity Scale and the Freiburg Mindfulness Inventory. In addition, subjective time judgments on the current passage of time and retrospective time ranges were assessed. While subjective judgements of time were found to be significantly different between the two groups on several scales, no differences in duration estimates in the psychophysical tasks were detected. Regarding subjective time, mindfulness meditators experienced less time pressure, more time dilation, and a general slower passage of time. Moreover, they felt that the last week and the last month passed more slowly. Overall, although no intergroup differences in psychophysical tasks were detected, the reported findings demonstrate a close association between mindfulness meditation and the subjective feeling of the passage of time captured by psychometric instruments.