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Recent research suggests that bodily signals and interoception are strongly related to our sense of time. Mindfulness meditators train to be aware of their body states and therefore could be more accurate at interval timing. In this study, n = 22 experienced mindfulness meditators and n = 22 matched controls performed both, an acoustic and a visual duration reproduction task of 8, 14, and 20 s intervals, while heart rate and skin conductance were continuously assessed. In addition, participants accomplished a heart beat perception task and two selective attention tasks. Results revealed no differences between meditators and controls with respect to performance in duration reproduction or attentional capacities. Additionally no group difference in heart beat perception scores was found. Across all subjects, correlational analyses revealed several associations between performance in the duration reproduction tasks and psychophysiological changes, the latter being also related to heart beat perception scores. Furthermore, former findings of linearly increasing cardiac periods and decreasing skin conductance levels during the auditory duration estimation task (Meissner and Wittmann, 2011) could be replicated, and these changes could also be observed during a visual duration reproduction task. In contrast to our earlier findings, the heart beat perception test was not related with timing performance. Overall, although experienced meditators did not differ from matched controls with respect to duration reproduction and interoceptive awareness, this study adds significantly to the emerging view that time perception is related to autonomic regulation and awareness of body states.

The study aimed at experimentally investigating whether the human body can anticipate future events under improved methodological conditions. Previous studies have reported contradictory results for the phenomenon typically called presentiment. If the positive findings are accurate, they call into doubt our views about human perception, and if they are inaccurate, a plausible conventional explanation might be based on the experimental design of the previous studies, in which expectation due to item sequences was misinterpreted as presentiment. To address these points, we opted to collect several physiological variables, to test different randomization types and to manipulate subjective significance individually. For the latter, we combined a mock crime scenario, in which participants had to steal specific items, with a concealed information test (CIT), in which the participants had to conceal their knowledge when interrogated about items they had stolen or not stolen. We measured electrodermal activity, respiration, finger pulse, heart rate (HR), and reaction times. The participants (n = 154) were assigned randomly to four different groups. Items presented in the CIT were either drawn with replacement (full) or without replacement (pseudo) and were either presented category-wise (cat) or regardless of categories (nocat). To understand how these item sequences influence expectation and modulate physiological reactions, we compared the groups with respect to effect sizes for stolen vs. not stolen items. Group pseudo_cat yielded the highest effect sizes, and pseudo_nocat yielded the lowest. We could not find any evidence of presentiment but did find evidence of physiological correlates of expectation. Due to the design differing fundamentally from previous studies, these findings do not allow for conclusions on the question whether the expectation bias is being confounded with presentiment.

Cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression, two major emotion regulation strategies, are differentially related to emotional well-being. The aim of this study was to test the association of individual differences in these two emotion regulation strategies with gray matter volume of brain regions that have been shown to be involved in the regulation of emotions. Based on high-resolution magnetic resonance images of 96 young adults voxel-based morphometry was used to analyze the gray matter volumes of the a priori regions of interest, including amygdala, insula, dorsal anterior cingulate and paracingulate cortex, medial and lateral prefrontal cortex (PFC) and their association with cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression usage as well as neuroticism. A positive association of cognitive reappraisal with right and tendentially left amygdala volume and of neuroticism with left amygdala volume (marginally significant) was found. Expressive suppression was related to dorsal anterior cingulate/paracingulate cortex and medial PFC gray matter volume. The results of this study emphasize the important role of the amygdala in individual differences in cognitive reappraisal usage as well as neuroticism. Additionally, the association of expressive suppression usage with larger volumes of the medial PFC and dorsal anterior/paracingulate cortex underpins the role of these regions in regulating emotion-expressive behavior.

Cocaine-dependent individuals show altered brain activation during decision making. It is unclear, however, whether these activation differences are related to relapse vulnerability. This study tested the hypothesis that brain-activation patterns during reinforcement learning are linked to relapse 1 year later in individuals entering treatment for cocaine dependence. Subjects performed a Paper-Scissors-Rock task during functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). A year later, we examined whether subjects had remained abstinent (n=15) or relapsed (n=15). Although the groups did not differ on demographic characteristics, behavioral performance, or lifetime substance use, abstinent patients reported greater motivation to win than relapsed patients. The fMRI results indicated that compared with abstinent individuals, relapsed users exhibited lower activation in (1) bilateral inferior frontal gyrus and striatum during decision making more generally; and (2) bilateral middle frontal gyrus and anterior insula during reward contingency learning in particular. Moreover, whereas abstinent patients exhibited greater left middle frontal and striatal activation to wins than losses, relapsed users did not demonstrate modulation in these regions as a function of outcome valence. Thus, individuals at high risk for relapse relative to those who are able to abstain allocate fewer neural resources to action-outcome contingency formation and decision making, as well as having less motivation to win on a laboratory-based task.

There is some evidence that neuroimaging can be used to predict relapse among abstinent methamphetamine-dependent (MD) individuals. However, it remains unclear what cognitive and neural processes contribute to relapse. This investigation examined whether insula activation during risk-taking decisions-a process shown to be disrupted in MD-is able to predict susceptibility for relapse. Sixty-eight MD enrolled in a treatment program during early abstinence completed a risk-taking task during functional magnetic resonance imaging. Sixty-three of the sixty-eight individuals were followed up 1 year after the study. Of these, 18 MD reported relapse. The 45 abstinent MD showed patterns of insula activation during risky decisions that resembled those found in prior studies of healthy controls, consisting of lower insula activation during safe decisions paired with higher activation during risky decisions. In contrast, the 18 relapsed MD showed similar insula activation during safe and risky decisions. An increase in one standard deviation in the difference in insula activation between risky and safe choices was associated with a 0.34 odds ratio for relapse at any given time. A median split of insula activation (difference between risky and safe) showed that individuals in the bottom half were two times more likely to relapse. In addition, a model that included several other brain regions increased prediction accuracy compared with insula-based model alone. These results suggest that failure to differentially activate the insula as a function of risk is a part of an altered risk-processing network associated with an increased susceptibility to relapse.

The belief in free will has been frequently challenged since Benjamin Libet published his famous experiment in 1983. Although Libet's experiment is highly dependent upon subjective reports, no study has been conducted that focused on a first-person or introspective perspective of the task. We took a neurophenomenological approach in an N=1 study providing reliable and valid measures of the first-person perspective in conjunction with brain dynamics. We found that a larger readiness potential (RP) is attributable to more frequent occurrences of self-initiated movements during negative deflections of the slow cortical potentials (SCP). These negative deflections occur in parallel with an inner impulse reported by an expert meditator which may in turn lead to a voluntary act. We demonstrate in this proof-of-principle approach that the first-person perspective obtained by an expert meditator in conjunction with neural signal analysis can contribute to our understanding of the neural underpinnings of voluntary acts.

This study addresses the controversy over how motor maps are organized during action simulation by examining whether action simulation states, that is, motor imagery and action observation, run on either effector-specific and/or action-specific motor maps. Subjects had to observe or imagine three types of movements effected by the right hand or the right foot with different action goals. The functional magnetic resonance imaging results showed an action-specific organization within premotor and posterior parietal areas of both hemispheres during action simulation, especially during action observation. There were also less pronounced effector-specific activation sites during both simulation processes. It is concluded that the premotor and parietal areas contain multiple motor maps rather than a single, continuous map of the body. The forms of simulation (observation, imagery), the task contexts (movements related to an object, with usual/unusual effector), and the underlying reason for performing the simulation (rate your subjective success afterwards) lead to the specific use of different representational motor maps within both regions. In our experimental setting, action-specific maps are dominant especially, during action observation, whereas effector-specific maps are recruited to only a lesser degree.

Data from three experiments on serial perception of temporal intervals in the supra-second domain are reported. Sequences of short acoustic signals ("pips") separated by periods of silence were presented to the observers. Two types of time series, geometric or alternating, were used, where the modulus 1+δ of the inter-pip series and the base duration Tb (range from 1.1 to 6s) were varied as independent parameters. The observers had to judge whether the series were accelerating, decelerating, or uniform (3 paradigm), or to distinguish regular from irregular sequences (2 paradigm). "Intervals of subjective uniformity" (isus) were obtained by fitting Gaussian psychometric functions to individual subjects' responses. Progression towards longer base durations (Tb=4.4 or 6s) shifts the isus towards negative δs, i.e., accelerating series. This finding is compatible with the phenomenon of "subjective shortening" of past temporal intervals, which is naturally accounted for by the lossy integration model of internal time representation. The opposite effect observed for short durations (Tb=1.1 or 1.5s) remains unexplained by the lossy integration model, and presents a challenge for further research.

When a voluntary action is causally linked with a sensory outcome, the action and its consequent effect are perceived as being closer together in time. This effect is called intentional binding. Although many experiments were conducted on this phenomenon, the underlying neural mechanisms are not well understood. While intentional binding is specific to voluntary action, we presumed that preconscious brain activity (the readiness potential, RP), which occurs before an action is made, might play an important role in this binding effect. In this study, the brain dynamics were recorded with electroencephalography (EEG) and analyzed in single-trials in order to estimate whether intentional binding is correlated with the early neural processes. Moreover, we were interested in different behavioral performance between meditators and non-meditators since meditators are expected to be able to keep attention more consistently on a task. Thus, we performed the intentional binding paradigm with 20 mindfulness meditators and compared them to matched controls. Although, we did not observe a group effect on either behavioral data or EEG recordings, we found that self-initiated movements following ongoing negative deflections of slow cortical potentials (SCPs) result in a stronger binding effect compared to positive potentials, especially regarding the perceived time of the consequent effect. Our results provide the first direct evidence that the early neural activity within the range of SCPs affects perceived time of a sensory outcome that is caused by intentional action.

We investigated the impact of sexual stimuli and the influence of sexual motivation on the performance in a dot-probe task and a line-orientation task in a large sample of males and females. All pictures (neutral, erotic) were rated on the dimensions of valence, arousal, disgust, and sexual arousal. Additionally, questionnaires measuring sexual interest/desire/motivation were employed. The ratings of the sexual stimuli point to a successful picture selection because sexual arousal did not differ between the sexes. The stimuli were equally arousing for men and women. Higher scores in the employed questionnaires measuring sexual interest/desire/motivation led to higher sexual arousal ratings of the sex pictures. Attentional bias towards sex pictures was observed in both experimental tasks. The attentional biases measured by the dot-probe and the line-orientation task were moderately intercorrelated suggesting attentional bias as a possible marker for a sex-attention trait. Finally, only the sexual sensation seeking score correlated with the attentional biases of the two tasks. Future research is needed to increase the predictive power of these indirect measures of sexual interest.

BACKGROUND: Asperger Autism is a lifelong psychiatric condition with highly circumscribed interests and routines, problems in social cognition, verbal and nonverbal communication, and also perceptual abnormalities with sensory hypersensitivity. To objectify both lower-level visual and cognitive alterations we looked for differences in visual event-related potentials (EEG) between Asperger observers and matched controls while they observed simple checkerboard stimuli. METHODS: In a balanced oddball paradigm checkerboards of two checksizes (0.6° and 1.2°) were presented with different frequencies. Participants counted the occurrence times of the rare fine or rare coarse checkerboards in different experimental conditions. We focused on early visual ERP differences as a function of checkerboard size and the classical P3b ERP component as an indicator of cognitive processing. RESULTS: We found an early (100-200 ms after stimulus onset) occipital ERP effect of checkerboard size (dominant spatial frequency). This effect was weaker in the Asperger than in the control observers. Further a typical parietal/central oddball-P3b occurred at 500 ms with the rare checkerboards. The P3b showed a right-hemispheric lateralization, which was more prominent in Asperger than in control observers. DISCUSSION: The difference in the early occipital ERP effect between the two groups may be a physiological marker of differences in the processing of small visual details in Asperger observers compared to normal controls. The stronger lateralization of the P3b in Asperger observers may indicate a stronger involvement of the right-hemispheric network of bottom-up attention. The lateralization of the P3b signal might be a compensatory consequence of the compromised early checksize effect. Higher-level analytical information processing units may need to compensate for difficulties in low-level signal analysis.

Ambiguous figures attract observers because perception alternates between different interpretations while the sensory information stays unchanged. Understanding the underlying processes is difficult because the precise time instant of this endogenous reversal event needs to be known but is difficult to measure. Presenting ambiguous figures discontinuously and using stimulus onset as estimation of the reversal event increased temporal resolution and provided a series of well-confirmed EEG signatures. In the current EEG study we used this 'onset paradigm' for the first time with Boring's old/young woman stimulus. We found an early occipital event-related potential (ERP) correlate of reversals between the perception of the old woman and the perception of the young woman that fits well with previous ERP findings. This component was not followed by the often-reported occipito-parietal Reversal Negativity at 260 ms, but instead by an occipito-temporal N170, that is typically reported with face stimuli. We interpret our results as follows: ambiguity conflicts take place during processing of stimulus elements in early visual areas roughly 130 ms after stimulus onset. The disambiguation of these elements and their assembly to object 'gestalts' result from an interplay between early visual and object-specific brain areas in a temporal window between 130 and 260 ms after stimulus onset. In the particular case of Boring's old/young woman the processes of element disambiguation and gestalt construction are already finished at 170 ms and, thus, 90 ms earlier than in the case of ambiguous geometric figures (eg Necker cube or Schroeder staircase) or of binocular rivalrous gratings.

Temporally distributed ("spaced") learning can be twice as efficient as massed learning. This "spacing effect" occurs with a broad spectrum of learning materials, with humans of different ages, with non-human vertebrates and also invertebrates. This indicates, that very basic learning mechanisms are at work ("generality"). Although most studies so far focused on very narrow spacing interval ranges, there is some evidence for a non-monotonic behavior of this "spacing effect" ("nonlinearity") with optimal spacing intervals at different time scales. In the current study we focused both the nonlinearity aspect by using a broad range of spacing intervals and the generality aspect by using very different learning/practice domains: Participants learned German-Japanese word pairs and performed visual acuity tests. For each of six groups we used a different spacing interval between learning/practice units from 7 min to 24 h in logarithmic steps. Memory retention was studied in three consecutive final tests, one, seven and 28 days after the final learning unit. For both the vocabulary learning and visual acuity performance we found a highly significant effect of the factor spacing interval on the final test performance. In the 12 h-spacing-group about 85% of the learned words stayed in memory and nearly all of the visual acuity gain was preserved. In the 24 h-spacing-group, in contrast, only about 33% of the learned words were retained and the visual acuity gain dropped to zero. The very similar patterns of results from the two very different learning/practice domains point to similar underlying mechanisms. Further, our results indicate spacing in the range of 12 hours as optimal. A second peak may be around a spacing interval of 20 min but here the data are less clear. We discuss relations between our results and basic learning at the neuronal level.

The concept of the minimal self refers to the consciousness of oneself as an immediate subject of experience. According to recent studies, disturbances of the minimal self may be a core feature of schizophrenia. They are emphasized in classical psychiatry literature and in phenomenological work. Impaired minimal self-experience may be defined as a distortion of one's first-person experiential perspective as, for example, an "altered presence" during which the sense of the experienced self ("mineness") is subtly affected, or "altered sense of demarcation," i.e., a difficulty discriminating the self from the non-self. Little is known, however, about the cognitive basis of these disturbances. In fact, recent work indicates that disorders of the self are not correlated with cognitive impairments commonly found in schizophrenia such as working-memory and attention disorders. In addition, a major difficulty with exploring the minimal self experimentally lies in its definition as being non-self-reflexive, and distinct from the verbalized, explicit awareness of an "I." In this paper, we shall discuss the possibility that disturbances of the minimal self observed in patients with schizophrenia are related to alterations in time processing. We shall review the literature on schizophrenia and time processing that lends support to this possibility. In particular we shall discuss the involvement of temporal integration windows on different time scales (implicit time processing) as well as duration perception disturbances (explicit time processing) in disorders of the minimal self. We argue that a better understanding of the relationship between time and the minimal self as well of issues of embodiment require research that looks more specifically at implicit time processing. Some methodological issues will be discussed.

The perception of time is a fundamental part of human experience. Recent research suggests that the experience of time emerges from emotional and interoceptive (bodily) states as processed in the insular cortex. Whether there is an interaction between the conscious awareness of interoceptive states and time distortions induced by emotions has rarely been investigated so far. We aimed to address this question by the use of a retrospective time estimation task comparing two groups of participants. One group had a focus on interoceptive states and one had a focus on exteroceptive information while watching film clips depicting fear, amusement and neutral content. Main results were that attention to interoceptive processes significantly affected subjective time experience. Fear was accompanied with subjective time dilation that was more pronounced in the group with interoceptive focus, while amusement led to a quicker passage of time which was also increased by interoceptive focus. We conclude that retrospective temporal distortions are directly influenced by attention to bodily responses. These effects might crucially interact with arousal levels. Sympathetic nervous system activation affecting memory build-up might be the decisive factor influencing retrospective time judgments. Our data substantially extend former research findings underscoring the relevance of interoception for the effects of emotional states on subjective time experience.

We report results of an acoustic duration reproduction task with stimulus duration of 2, 4, and 6 s, using 45 emotionally negative, positive, and neutral sounds from the International Affective Digitized Sounds System, in a sample of 31 young healthy participants. To investigate the influence of induced emotions on perceived duration, the effects of emotional modulation were quantified in two ways: (1) via model-free indices (aggregated ratios of reproduced times), and (2) via dual klepsydra model (dkm)-based estimates of parameters of internal time representation. Both data-analytic approaches reveal an effect of emotional valence/arousal, namely, a significantly longer reproduction response for emotional stimuli than for the neutral stimuli. The advantage of the dkm-based approach is its ability to disentangle stimulus-related effects, which are represented by "flow intensities," from general effects which are due to the lossy character of temporal integration. We explain the rationale of the dkm-based strategy and interpret the observed effect within the dkm-framework as transient increase of internal "flows." This interpretation is in line with recent conceptualizations of an "embodiment" of time where the model-posited flows correspond to the ongoing stream of interoceptive (bodily) neural signals. Neurophysiological findings on correlations between the processing of body signals and the perception of time provide cumulative evidence for this working hypothesis.