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The concept of the minimal self refers to the consciousness of oneself as an immediate subject of experience. According to recent studies, disturbances of the minimal self may be a core feature of schizophrenia. They are emphasized in classical psychiatry literature and in phenomenological work. Impaired minimal self-experience may be defined as a distortion of one's first-person experiential perspective as, for example, an "altered presence" during which the sense of the experienced self ("mineness") is subtly affected, or "altered sense of demarcation," i.e., a difficulty discriminating the self from the non-self. Little is known, however, about the cognitive basis of these disturbances. In fact, recent work indicates that disorders of the self are not correlated with cognitive impairments commonly found in schizophrenia such as working-memory and attention disorders. In addition, a major difficulty with exploring the minimal self experimentally lies in its definition as being non-self-reflexive, and distinct from the verbalized, explicit awareness of an "I." In this paper, we shall discuss the possibility that disturbances of the minimal self observed in patients with schizophrenia are related to alterations in time processing. We shall review the literature on schizophrenia and time processing that lends support to this possibility. In particular we shall discuss the involvement of temporal integration windows on different time scales (implicit time processing) as well as duration perception disturbances (explicit time processing) in disorders of the minimal self. We argue that a better understanding of the relationship between time and the minimal self as well of issues of embodiment require research that looks more specifically at implicit time processing. Some methodological issues will be discussed.

The perception of time is a fundamental part of human experience. Recent research suggests that the experience of time emerges from emotional and interoceptive (bodily) states as processed in the insular cortex. Whether there is an interaction between the conscious awareness of interoceptive states and time distortions induced by emotions has rarely been investigated so far. We aimed to address this question by the use of a retrospective time estimation task comparing two groups of participants. One group had a focus on interoceptive states and one had a focus on exteroceptive information while watching film clips depicting fear, amusement and neutral content. Main results were that attention to interoceptive processes significantly affected subjective time experience. Fear was accompanied with subjective time dilation that was more pronounced in the group with interoceptive focus, while amusement led to a quicker passage of time which was also increased by interoceptive focus. We conclude that retrospective temporal distortions are directly influenced by attention to bodily responses. These effects might crucially interact with arousal levels. Sympathetic nervous system activation affecting memory build-up might be the decisive factor influencing retrospective time judgments. Our data substantially extend former research findings underscoring the relevance of interoception for the effects of emotional states on subjective time experience.

We report results of an acoustic duration reproduction task with stimulus duration of 2, 4, and 6 s, using 45 emotionally negative, positive, and neutral sounds from the International Affective Digitized Sounds System, in a sample of 31 young healthy participants. To investigate the influence of induced emotions on perceived duration, the effects of emotional modulation were quantified in two ways: (1) via model-free indices (aggregated ratios of reproduced times), and (2) via dual klepsydra model (dkm)-based estimates of parameters of internal time representation. Both data-analytic approaches reveal an effect of emotional valence/arousal, namely, a significantly longer reproduction response for emotional stimuli than for the neutral stimuli. The advantage of the dkm-based approach is its ability to disentangle stimulus-related effects, which are represented by "flow intensities," from general effects which are due to the lossy character of temporal integration. We explain the rationale of the dkm-based strategy and interpret the observed effect within the dkm-framework as transient increase of internal "flows." This interpretation is in line with recent conceptualizations of an "embodiment" of time where the model-posited flows correspond to the ongoing stream of interoceptive (bodily) neural signals. Neurophysiological findings on correlations between the processing of body signals and the perception of time provide cumulative evidence for this working hypothesis.

Experienced meditators typically report that they experience time slowing down in meditation practice as well as in everyday life. Conceptually this phenomenon may be understood through functional states of mindfulness, i.e., by attention regulation, body awareness, emotion regulation, and enhanced memory. However, hardly any systematic empirical work exists regarding the experience of time in meditators. In the current cross-sectional study, we investigated whether 42 experienced mindfulness meditation practitioners (with on average 10 years of experience) showed differences in the experience of time as compared to 42 controls without any meditation experience matched for age, sex, and education. The perception of time was assessed with a battery of psychophysical tasks assessing the accuracy of prospective time judgments in duration discrimination, duration reproduction, and time estimation in the milliseconds to minutes range as well with several psychometric instruments related to subjective time such as the Zimbardo Time Perspective Inventory, the Barratt Impulsivity Scale and the Freiburg Mindfulness Inventory. In addition, subjective time judgments on the current passage of time and retrospective time ranges were assessed. While subjective judgements of time were found to be significantly different between the two groups on several scales, no differences in duration estimates in the psychophysical tasks were detected. Regarding subjective time, mindfulness meditators experienced less time pressure, more time dilation, and a general slower passage of time. Moreover, they felt that the last week and the last month passed more slowly. Overall, although no intergroup differences in psychophysical tasks were detected, the reported findings demonstrate a close association between mindfulness meditation and the subjective feeling of the passage of time captured by psychometric instruments.

It has been repeatedly shown that specific brain activity related to planning movement develops before the conscious intention to act. This empirical finding strongly challenges the notion of free will. Here, we demonstrate that in the Libet experiment, spontaneous fluctuations of the slow electro-cortical potentials (SCPs) account for a significant fraction of the readiness potential (RP). The individual potential shifts preceding self-initiated movements were classified as showing a negative or positive shift. The negative and positive potential shifts were analyzed in a self-initiated movement condition and in a no-movement condition. Comparing the potential shifts between both conditions, we observed no differences in the early part of the potential. This reveals that the apparently negative RP emerges through an unequal ratio of negative and positive potential shifts. These results suggest that ongoing negative shifts of the SCPs facilitate self-initiated movement but are not related to processes underlying preparation or decision to act.

A large number of competing models exist for how the brain creates a representation of time. However, several human and animal studies point to 'climbing neural activation' as a potential neural mechanism for the representation of duration. Neurophysiological recordings in animals have revealed how climbing neural activation that peaks at the end of a timed interval underlies the processing of duration, and, in humans, climbing neural activity in the insular cortex, which is associated with feeling states of the body and emotions, may be related to the cumulative representation of time.

The "dual klepsydra model" (DKM) of internal time representation successfully models duration reproduction data, but relations between the DKM-based parameter kappa ("loss rate") and procedural variables (presentation modality) or individual characteristics (cognitive indices, age, sex) remained as yet unexplored. For that purpose, were-analyzed data from an earlier time reproduction study (N = 100), using visually or acoustically presented intervals of 1-5 sec. duration. Typical values of parameter kappa were approximately 0.03-0.04 sec.(-1), corresponding to relaxation times of internal "lossy integrators" of approximately 30 sec. Significant effects of presentation modality (smaller kappa values for the visual reproduction task) and of age (greater kappa in acoustic reproduction with increasing age) were observed. Cognitive variables (working memory, general fluid reasoning, attention) and sex of participants were not associated with kappa. Cognitive functions seem to play only a minor, if any, role at the level of time representation addressed by the DKM.

Several studies provide empirical evidence for the association between impulsivity and time perception. However, little is known about the neural substrates underlying this function. This investigation examined the influence of impulsivity on neural activation patterns during the encoding and reproduction of intervals with durations of 3, 9 and 18s using event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Twenty-seven subjects participated in this study, including 15 high impulsive subjects that were classified based on their self-rating. FMRI activation during the duration reproduction task was correlated with measures of two self-report questionnaires related to the concept of impulsivity (Barratt Impulsiveness Scale, BIS; Zimbardo Time Perspective Inventory, ZTPI). Behaviorally, those individuals who under-reproduced temporal intervals also showed lower scores on the ZTPI future perspective subscale and higher scores on the BIS. FMRI activation revealed an accumulating pattern of neural activity peaking at the end of the 9- and 18-s intervals within right posterior insula. Activations of brain regions during the reproduction phase of the timing task, such as those related to motor execution as well as to the 'core control network' - encompassing the inferior frontal and medial frontal cortices, the anterior insula as well as the inferior parietal cortex - were significantly correlated with reproduced duration, as well as with BIS and ZTPI subscales. In particular, the greater activation in these regions the shorter were the reproduced intervals, the more impulsive was an individual and the less pronounced the future perspective. Activation in the core control network, thus, may form a biological marker for cognitive time management and for impulsiveness.

Recent research suggests that our sense of time intervals in the range of seconds is directly related to activity in the insular cortex, which contains the primary sensory area for interoception. We therefore investigated whether performance in a duration reproduction task might correlate with individual interoceptive awareness and with measurable changes in autonomic activity during the task. Thirty-one healthy volunteers participated in an interoceptive (heartbeat) perception task and in repeated temporal reproduction trials using intervals of 8, 14, and 20s duration while skin conductance levels and cardiac and respiratory periods were recorded. We observed progressive increases in cardiac periods and decreases in skin conductance level during the encoding and (less reliably) the reproduction of these intervals. Notably, individuals' duration reproduction accuracy correlated positively both with the slope of cardiac slowing during the encoding intervals and with individual heartbeat perception scores. These results support the view that autonomic function and interoceptive awareness underpin our perception of time intervals in the range of seconds.

It has been suggested that perception and action can be understood as evolving in temporal epochs or sequential processing units. Successive events are fused into units forming a unitary experience or "psychological present." Studies have identified several temporal integration levels on different time scales which are fundamental for our understanding of behavior and subjective experience. In recent literature concerning the philosophy and neuroscience of consciousness these separate temporal processing levels are not always precisely distinguished. Therefore, empirical evidence from psychophysics and neuropsychology on these distinct temporal processing levels is presented and discussed within philosophical conceptualizations of time experience. On an elementary level, one can identify a functional moment, a basic temporal building block of perception in the range of milliseconds that defines simultaneity and succession. Below a certain threshold temporal order is not perceived, individual events are processed as co-temporal. On a second level, an experienced moment, which is based on temporal integration of up to a few seconds, has been reported in many qualitatively different experiments in perception and action. It has been suggested that this segmental processing mechanism creates temporal windows that provide a logistical basis for conscious representation and the experience of nowness. On a third level of integration, continuity of experience is enabled by working memory in the range of multiple seconds allowing the maintenance of cognitive operations and emotional feelings, leading to mental presence, a temporal window of an individual's experienced presence.

Analyses of neural mechanisms of duration processing are essential for the understanding of psychological phenomena which evolve in time. Different mechanisms are presumably responsible for the processing of shorter (below 500 ms) and longer (above 500 ms) events but have not yet been a subject of an investigation with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). In the present study, we show a greater involvement of several brain regions - including right-hemispheric midline structures and left-hemispheric lateral regions - in the processing of visual stimuli of shorter as compared to longer duration. We propose a greater involvement of lower-level cognitive mechanisms in the processing of shorter events as opposed to higher-level mechanisms of cognitive control involved in longer events.

Individuals are different 'chronotypes' with early 'larks' and late 'owls' forming the limits of a normal distribution in the population. We recently described that late chronotypes who suffer from a conflict between internal and external time ('social jetlag') suffer from more mental distress and are more likely to smoke than early chronotypes (Wittmann, Dinich, Merrow, and Roenneberg, 2006 . Social jetlag: mis-alignment of biological and social time. Chronobiology International, 23:497-509.). We performed a detailed analysis of the same database collected in 2002 comprising 134 daily smokers and 366 nonsmokers, scrutinizing the relationships between chronotype, smoking, and alcohol consumption as well as psychological well-being using a multiple mediation analysis. On average, smokers tend to be later chronotypes, report more sleep-associated psychosomatic symptoms, are more depressed, less balanced, and less vigilant. The mediation analysis suggests that only those late chronotypes who smoke and those who drink more suffer from increased psychological distress. We suggest that 'chronotype' is introduced as an additional factor in substance use, that is, when considering motives for smoking and drinking.

An object moving towards an observer is subjectively perceived as longer in duration than the same object that is static or moving away. This "time dilation effect" has been shown for a number of stimuli that differ from standard events along different feature dimensions (e.g. color, size, and dynamics). We performed an event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, while subjects viewed a stream of five visual events, all of which were static and of identical duration except the fourth one, which was a deviant target consisting of either a looming or a receding disc. The duration of the target was systematically varied and participants judged whether the target was shorter or longer than all other events. A time dilation effect was observed only for looming targets. Relative to the static standards, the looming as well as the receding targets induced increased activation of the anterior insula and anterior cingulate cortices (the "core control network"). The decisive contrast between looming and receding targets representing the time dilation effect showed strong asymmetric activation and, specifically, activation of cortical midline structures (the "default network"). These results provide the first evidence that the illusion of temporal dilation is due to activation of areas that are important for cognitive control and subjective awareness. The involvement of midline structures in the temporal dilation illusion is interpreted as evidence that time perception is related to self-referential processing.

In experimental studies using flight simulations subjects' duration estimates have shown to be an effective indicator of cognitive task demands. In this study we wanted to find out whether subjective time perception could serve as a measure of cognitive workload during simulated car driving. Participants drove on a round course of a driving simulator consisting of three different environments with different levels of task demands. Drivers were required to perform a time-production task while driving the vehicle. Electrodermal activity and subjective ratings of mental workload (SWAT) were recorded simultaneously. The length of produced intervals increased significantly in more complex driving situations, as did electrodermal activity and subjective ratings of mental workload. Thus, time production is a valid indicator of cognitive involvement in simulated driving and could become a valid method to measure the current mental workload of car drivers in various traffic situations.

The present paper investigates the effects of age, sex, and cognitive factors on temporal-order perception. Nine temporal-order tasks were employed using two and four stimuli presented in the auditory and visual modalities. Significantly increased temporal-order thresholds (TOT) in the elderly were found for almost all tasks, while sex differences were only observed for two tasks. Multiple regression analyses show that the performance on most temporal-order tasks can be predicted by cognitive factors, such as speed of fluid reasoning, short-term memory, and attention. However, age was a significant predictor of TOT in three tasks using visual stimuli. We conclude (1) that age-related differences can often be attributed to cognitive factors involved in temporal-order perception, and (2) that the concept of temporal-order perception is more complex than implied by the current models.

Action of a hallucinogenic substance, psilocybin, on internal time representation was investigated in two double-blind, placebo-controlled studies: Experiment 1 with 12 subjects and graded doses, and Experiment 2 with 9 subjects and a very low dose. The task consisted in repeated reproductions of time intervals in the range from 1.5 to 5s. The effects were assessed by parameter kappa of the 'dual klepsydra' model of internal time representation, fitted to individual response data and intra-individually normalized with respect to initial values. The estimates kappa were in the same order of magnitude as in earlier studies. In both experiments, kappa was significantly increased by psilocybin at 90 min from the drug intake, indicating a higher loss rate of the internal duration representation. These findings are tentatively linked to qualitative alterations of subjective time in altered states of consciousness.

Neuropsychological studies in brain-injured patients with aphasia and children with specific language-learning deficits have shown the dependence of language comprehension on auditory processing abilities, i.e. the detection of temporal order. An impairment of temporal-order perception can be simulated by time reversing segments of the speech signal. In our study, we investigated how different lengths of time-reversed segments in speech influenced comprehension in ten native German speakers and ten participants who had acquired German as a second language. Results show that native speakers were still able to understand the distorted speech at segment lengths of 50 ms, whereas non-native speakers only could identify sentences with reversed intervals of 32 ms duration. These differences in performance can be interpreted by different levels of semantic and lexical proficiency. Our method of temporally-distorted speech offers a new approach to assess language skills that indirectly taps into lexical and semantic competence of non-native speakers.

Some authors have suggested separate mechanisms for the processing of temporal intervals above versus below 2-3s. Given that the evidence is mixed, the present experiment was carried out as a critical test of the separate-mechanism hypothesis. Subjects reproduced five standard durations of 1-5s presented in the auditory and visual modalities. The Corsi-block test was used to assess effects of working-memory span on different interval lengths. Greater working-memory span was associated with longer reproductions of intervals of 3-5s. A factor analysis run on mean reproduced intervals revealed one modality-unspecific factor for durations of 1-2s and two modality-specific factors for longer intervals. These results are interpreted as further indications that two different processes underlie temporal reproductions of shorter and longer intervals.

Hallucinogenic psilocybin is known to alter the subjective experience of time. However, there is no study that systematically investigated objective measures of time perception under psilocybin. Therefore, we studied dose-dependent effects of the serotonin (5-HT)2A/1A receptor agonist psilocybin (4-phosphoryloxy-N, N-dimethyltryptamine) on temporal processing, employing tasks of temporal reproduction, sensorimotor synchronization and tapping tempo. To control for cognitive and subjective changes, we assessed spatial working memory and conscious experience. Twelve healthy human volunteers were tested under placebo, medium (115 microg/kg), and high (250 microg/kg) dose conditions, in a double-blind experimental design. Psilocybin was found to significantly impair subjects' ability to (1) reproduce interval durations longer than 2.5 sec, (2) to synchronize to inter-beat intervals longer than 2 sec and (3) caused subjects to be slower in their preferred tapping rate. These objective effects on timing performance were accompanied by working-memory deficits and subjective changes in conscious state, namely increased reports of 'depersonalization' and 'derealization' phenomena including disturbances in subjective 'time sense.' Our study is the first to systematically assess the impact of psilocybin on timing performance on standardized measures of temporal processing. Results indicate that the serotonin system is selectively involved in duration processing of intervals longer than 2 to 3 seconds and in the voluntary control of the speed of movement. We speculate that psilocybin's selective disruption of longer intervals is likely to be a product of interactions with cognitive dimensions of temporal processing -presumably via 5-HT2A receptor stimulation.