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INTRODUCTION: We tested and validated the German version of a new instrument for measuring "wakefulness," defined as "an expansive, higher-functioning, and stable state of being in which a person's vision of and relationship to the world are transformed, along with their subjective experience, their sense of identity and their conceptual outlook" (Taylor, 2017, p. 22). METHODS: In order to test the construct validity of the new instrument (Inventory of Secular/Spiritual Wakefulness; WAKE-16), we performed a parametric comparison between a group of expert meditators (n=36) with a history of predominantly meditating in silence and demographically matched non-meditators (n=36) for the WAKE-16 and two conceptually related questionnaires of mindfulness and emotion regulation. RESULTS: Significantly higher scores for the meditators on the WAKE-16 indicate construct validity of the new instrument. Meditators scored higher on the two mindfulness subscales "presence" and "acceptance," as well as on the SEE subscales of emotion regulation and body-related symbolization of emotions. Within the group of meditators, there were significant correlations between wakefulness and mindfulness, accepting one's own emotions, and experiencing overwhelming emotions. The only significant correlation in non-meditators was found between wakefulness and accepting one's own emotions. DISCUSSION: The new instrument shows construct validity by discriminating between the two groups. Correlations between wakefulness and related psychological constructs indicate convergent validity. Future studies could attempt to increase discriminatory accuracy of the definition of wakefulness, as well as finding objective methods of measuring.

BACKGROUND: Distant intention research refers to experiments in which a distant interaction between two persons is assessed that precludes conventional communication. In these experiments the intention of one person is varied systematically while the effect of this variation is assessed in the remote other person. AIMS: Our study aimed at improving effect sizes by participant selection based on a screening test and by including experienced meditators. METHOD: 66 participants with meditation experience participated in a forced-choice psi-test as a screening test. Participants with similar performance were invited as pairs for a distant intention experiment. The task of the helpee was to focus attention on a candle and to indicate lapses in attention by pressing a button. In a within-subject design the task of the remote helper was either to assist the helpee in this effort or to engage in a distraction task. Electrodermal activity (EDA) and button presses from the helpee served as dependent variables. RESULTS AND CONCLUSION: Participants' performance in the psi-screening test did not exceed chance expectations. In the distant intention experiment with 30 sessions no distant intention effect could be found in the prespecified analyses. The results in the psi-screening test were not correlated with performance in the main experiment. However, we found a large negative correlation between self-reported exceptional experiences of the helper and two EDA variables, namely skin conductance level and number of non-specific skin conductance responses. This correlation, if replicated, can hardly be explained without the assumption of a distant interaction.

Our focus of attention naturally fluctuates between different sources of information even when we desire to focus on a single object. Focused attention (FA) meditation is associated with greater control over this process, yet the neuronal mechanisms underlying this ability are not entirely understood. Here, we hypothesize that the capacity of attention to transiently focus and swiftly change relates to the critical dynamics emerging when neuronal systems balance at a point of instability between order and disorder. In FA meditation, however, the ability to stay focused is trained, which may be associated with a more homogeneous brain state. To test this hypothesis, we applied analytical tools from criticality theory to EEG in meditation practitioners and meditation-naïve participants from two independent labs. We show that in practitioners-but not in controls-FA meditation strongly suppressed long-range temporal correlations (LRTC) of neuronal oscillations relative to eyes-closed rest with remarkable consistency across frequency bands and scalp locations. The ability to reduce LRTC during meditation increased after one year of additional training and was associated with the subjective experience of fully engaging one's attentional resources, also known as absorption. Sustained practice also affected normal waking brain dynamics as reflected in increased LRTC during an eyes-closed rest state, indicating that brain dynamics are altered beyond the meditative state. Taken together, our findings suggest that the framework of critical brain dynamics is promising for understanding neuronal mechanisms of meditative states and, specifically, we have identified a clear electrophysiological correlate of the FA meditation state.

Research on meditation is advancing, but few studies about the motivations of meditators exist. Additionally, many forms and traditions of meditation have yet to be investigated. This study addresses both of these issues by presenting an overview of different forms of motivations found in contemporary Anthroposophic meditation practice. 30 Anthroposophic meditators were interviewed about their meditation experiences. The interviews were examined using thematic analysis. 14 data-driven themes were extracted and organized within a framework consisting of three superordinate theory-driven forms of motivation: External, internal and service. A developmental trajectory running from external and internal to service motivations is indicated. This approach improves upon a scheme developed by Shapiro by including additional types of motivations and being able to differentiate between forms of motivations that are fundamentally different: Self-related (heteronomous and autonomous) motivations and other-related motivations.

The Necker-Zeno model of bistable perception provides a formal relation between the average duration of meta-stable percepts (dwell times T) of ambiguous figures and two other basic time scales (t(0), ΔT) underlying cognitive processing. The model predicts that dwell times T covary with t(0), ΔT or both. We tested this prediction by exploiting that observers, in particular experienced meditators, can volitionally control dwell times T. Meditators and non-meditators observed bistable Necker cubes either passively or tried to hold their current percept. The latencies of a centro-parietal event-related potential (CPP) were recorded as a physiological correlate of t(0). Dwell times T and the CPP latencies, correlated with t(0), differed between conditions and observer groups, while ΔT remained constant in the range predicted by the model. The covariation of CPP latencies and dwell times, as well as their quadratic functional dependence extends previous psychophysical confirmation of the Necker-Zeno model to psychophysiological measures.

BACKGROUND: During observation of the Necker cube perception becomes unstable and alternates repeatedly between a from-above-perspective ("fap") and a from-below-perspective ("fbp") interpretation. Both interpretations are physically equally plausible, however, observers usually show an a priori top-down bias in favor of the fap interpretation. Patients with Autism spectrum disorder are known to show an altered pattern of perception with a focus on sensory details. In the present study we tested whether this altered perceptual processing affects their reversal dynamics and reduces the perceptual bias during Necker cube observation. METHODS: 19 participants with Asperger syndrome and 16 healthy controls observed a Necker cube stimulus continuously for 5 minutes and indicated perceptual reversals by key press. We compared reversal rates (number of reversals per minute) and the distributions of dwell times for the two interpretations between observer groups. RESULTS: Asperger participants showed less perceptual reversal than controls. Six Asperger participants did not perceive any reversal at all, whereas all observers from the control group perceived at least five reversals within the five minutes observation time. Further, control participants showed the typical perceptual bias with significant longer median dwell times for the fap compared to the fbp interpretation. No such perceptual bias was found in the Asperger group. DISCUSSION: The perceptual system weights the incomplete and ambiguous sensory input with memorized concepts in order to construct stable and reliable percepts. In the case of the Necker cube stimulus, two perceptual interpretations are equally compatible with the sensory information and internal fluctuations may cause perceptual alternations between them-with a slightly larger probability value for the fap interpretation (perceptual bias). Smaller reversal rates in Asperger observers may result from the dominance of bottom-up sensory input over endogenous top-down factors. The latter may also explain the absence of a fap bias.

BACKGROUND: Although motor symptoms predominate in essential tremor, increasing evidence indicates additional cognitive deficits. According to the pivotal role of cognitive functioning for temporal information processing and acknowledging the relevance of temporal information processing for movement coordination, we investigated whether essential tremor patients exhibit time reproduction deficits. METHODS: A total of 24 essential tremor patients and 24 healthy controls performed sub- and suprasecond visual duration reproduction tasks of 500 to 900 milliseconds and 1.6 to 2.4 seconds, respectively. To differentiate deficient time processing from motor or other cognitive dysfunctions, the average temporal reproduction errors were correlated with tremor severity, immediate and delayed word-list recall performance, and verbal fluency. RESULTS: Essential tremor patients significantly underreproduced sub- and suprasecond time intervals longer than 800 milliseconds. Moreover, time compression correlated significantly with semantic verbal fluency and word-list retrieval performance, but not with tremor severity. CONCLUSION: Data suggest impaired temporal processing in essential tremor, corroborating evidence for specific cognitive deficits. © 2016 International Parkinson and Movement Disorder Society.

Research findings link rolandic beta-band activity to voluntary movements, but a linkage with the decision time to move remains unknown. We found that beta-band (16-28Hz) activity shortly before the movement onset is relevant for the decision time to move: the more pronounced the decrease in beta-band synchronization, the earlier the subjective experience of the decision to move. The linkage was relevant regarding 'decision', but not regarding 'intention' timing that has been often applied in the study of free will. Our findings suggest that oscillatory neural activity in the beta-band is an important neural signature pertaining to the subjective experience of making a decision to move.

Patients with schizophrenia have often been described as insensitive to nociceptive signals, but objective evidence is sparse. We address this question by combining subjective behavioral and objective neurochemical and neurophysiological measures. The present study involved 21 stabilized and mildly symptomatic patients with schizophrenia and 21 control subjects. We applied electrical stimulations below the pain threshold and assessed sensations of pain and unpleasantness with rating scales, and Somatosensory Evoked Potentials (SEPs/EEG). We also measured attention, two neurochemical stress indices (ACTH/cortisol), and subjective VEPs/EEG responses to visual emotional stimuli. Our results revealed that, subjectively, patients' evaluations do not differ from controls. However, the amplitude of EEG evoked potentials was greater in patients than controls as early as 50 ms after electrical stimulations and beyond one second after visual processing of emotional pictures. Such responses could not be linked to the stress induced by the stimulations, since stress hormone levels were stable. Nor was there a difference between patients and controls in respect of attention performance and tactile sensitivity. Taken together, all indices measured in patients in our study were either heightened or equivalent relative to healthy volunteers.

Hardly any empirical work exists concerning the relationship between the intra-individually stable time perspective relating to the past, present, and future and the subjective speed of time passing in everyday life. Moreover, studies consistently show that the subjective passage of time over the period of the last ten years speeds up as we get older. Modulating variables influencing this phenomenon are still unknown. To investigate these two unresolved issues, we conducted an online survey with n = 423 participants ranging in age between 17 and 81 assessing trait time perspective of the past, present, and future, and relating these subscales with a battery of measures pertaining to the subjective passage of time. Moreover, the subjective passage of time as an age-dependent variable was probed in relationship to emotion awareness, appraisal and regulation. Results show how present hedonism is linked with having fewer routines in life and a faster passage of the last week; the past negative perspective is related to time pressure, time expansion and more routine; a pronounced future perspective is related to a general faster passage of time. Importantly, increased emotion regulation and a balanced time perspective are related to a slower passage of the last ten years. These novel findings are discussed within models of time perception and the time perspective.

Intuitively, being aware of one's inner processes to move should be crucial for the control of voluntary movements. However, research findings suggest that we are not always aware of the processes leading to movement execution. The present study investigated induced first-person access to inner processes of movement initiation and the underlying brain activities which contribute to the emergence of voluntary movement. Moreover, we investigated differences in task performance between mindfulness meditators and non-meditators while assuming that meditators are more experienced in attending to their inner processes. Two Libet-type tasks were performed; one in which participants were asked to press a button at a moment of their own decision, and the other one in which participants' attention was directed towards their inner processes of decision making regarding the intended movement which lead them to press the button. Meditators revealed a consistent readiness potential (RP) between the two tasks with correlations between the subjective intention time to act and the slope of the early RP. However, non-meditators did not show this consistency. Instead, elicited introspection of inner processes of movement initiation changed early brain activity that is related to voluntary movement processes. Our findings suggest that compared to non-meditators, meditators are more able to access the emergence of negative deflections of slow cortical potentials (SCPs), which could have fundamental effects on initiating a voluntary movement with awareness.

Cocaine-dependent individuals show altered brain activation during decision making. It is unclear, however, whether these activation differences are related to relapse vulnerability. This study tested the hypothesis that brain-activation patterns during reinforcement learning are linked to relapse 1 year later in individuals entering treatment for cocaine dependence. Subjects performed a Paper-Scissors-Rock task during functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). A year later, we examined whether subjects had remained abstinent (n=15) or relapsed (n=15). Although the groups did not differ on demographic characteristics, behavioral performance, or lifetime substance use, abstinent patients reported greater motivation to win than relapsed patients. The fMRI results indicated that compared with abstinent individuals, relapsed users exhibited lower activation in (1) bilateral inferior frontal gyrus and striatum during decision making more generally; and (2) bilateral middle frontal gyrus and anterior insula during reward contingency learning in particular. Moreover, whereas abstinent patients exhibited greater left middle frontal and striatal activation to wins than losses, relapsed users did not demonstrate modulation in these regions as a function of outcome valence. Thus, individuals at high risk for relapse relative to those who are able to abstain allocate fewer neural resources to action-outcome contingency formation and decision making, as well as having less motivation to win on a laboratory-based task.

The belief in free will has been frequently challenged since Benjamin Libet published his famous experiment in 1983. Although Libet's experiment is highly dependent upon subjective reports, no study has been conducted that focused on a first-person or introspective perspective of the task. We took a neurophenomenological approach in an N=1 study providing reliable and valid measures of the first-person perspective in conjunction with brain dynamics. We found that a larger readiness potential (RP) is attributable to more frequent occurrences of self-initiated movements during negative deflections of the slow cortical potentials (SCP). These negative deflections occur in parallel with an inner impulse reported by an expert meditator which may in turn lead to a voluntary act. We demonstrate in this proof-of-principle approach that the first-person perspective obtained by an expert meditator in conjunction with neural signal analysis can contribute to our understanding of the neural underpinnings of voluntary acts.

BACKGROUND: Asperger Autism is a lifelong psychiatric condition with highly circumscribed interests and routines, problems in social cognition, verbal and nonverbal communication, and also perceptual abnormalities with sensory hypersensitivity. To objectify both lower-level visual and cognitive alterations we looked for differences in visual event-related potentials (EEG) between Asperger observers and matched controls while they observed simple checkerboard stimuli. METHODS: In a balanced oddball paradigm checkerboards of two checksizes (0.6° and 1.2°) were presented with different frequencies. Participants counted the occurrence times of the rare fine or rare coarse checkerboards in different experimental conditions. We focused on early visual ERP differences as a function of checkerboard size and the classical P3b ERP component as an indicator of cognitive processing. RESULTS: We found an early (100-200 ms after stimulus onset) occipital ERP effect of checkerboard size (dominant spatial frequency). This effect was weaker in the Asperger than in the control observers. Further a typical parietal/central oddball-P3b occurred at 500 ms with the rare checkerboards. The P3b showed a right-hemispheric lateralization, which was more prominent in Asperger than in control observers. DISCUSSION: The difference in the early occipital ERP effect between the two groups may be a physiological marker of differences in the processing of small visual details in Asperger observers compared to normal controls. The stronger lateralization of the P3b in Asperger observers may indicate a stronger involvement of the right-hemispheric network of bottom-up attention. The lateralization of the P3b signal might be a compensatory consequence of the compromised early checksize effect. Higher-level analytical information processing units may need to compensate for difficulties in low-level signal analysis.

It has been repeatedly shown that specific brain activity related to planning movement develops before the conscious intention to act. This empirical finding strongly challenges the notion of free will. Here, we demonstrate that in the Libet experiment, spontaneous fluctuations of the slow electro-cortical potentials (SCPs) account for a significant fraction of the readiness potential (RP). The individual potential shifts preceding self-initiated movements were classified as showing a negative or positive shift. The negative and positive potential shifts were analyzed in a self-initiated movement condition and in a no-movement condition. Comparing the potential shifts between both conditions, we observed no differences in the early part of the potential. This reveals that the apparently negative RP emerges through an unequal ratio of negative and positive potential shifts. These results suggest that ongoing negative shifts of the SCPs facilitate self-initiated movement but are not related to processes underlying preparation or decision to act.

PURPOSE: We sought brain activity that predicts visual consciousness. METHODS: We used electroencephalography (EEG) to measure brain activity to a 1000-ms display of sine-wave gratings, oriented vertically in one eye and horizontally in the other. This display yields binocular rivalry: irregular alternations in visual consciousness between the images viewed by the eyes. We replaced both gratings with 200 ms of darkness, the gap, before showing a second display of the same rival gratings for another 1000 ms. We followed this by a 1000-ms mask then a 2000-ms inter-trial interval (ITI). Eleven participants pressed keys after the second display in numerous trials to say whether the orientation of the visible grating changed from before to after the gap or not. Each participant also responded to numerous non-rivalry trials in which the gratings had identical orientations for the two eyes and for which the orientation of both either changed physically after the gap or did not. RESULTS: We found that greater activity from lateral occipital-parietal-temporal areas about 180 ms after initial onset of rival stimuli predicted a change in visual consciousness more than 1000 ms later, on re-presentation of the rival stimuli. We also found that less activity from parietal, central, and frontal electrodes about 400 ms after initial onset of rival stimuli predicted a change in visual consciousness about 800 ms later, on re-presentation of the rival stimuli. There was no such predictive activity when the change in visual consciousness occurred because the stimuli changed physically. CONCLUSION: We found early EEG activity that predicted later visual consciousness. Predictive activity 180 ms after onset of the first display may reflect adaption of the neurons mediating visual consciousness in our displays. Predictive activity 400 ms after onset of the first display may reflect a less-reliable brain state mediating visual consciousness.

The "dual klepsydra model" (DKM) of internal time representation successfully models duration reproduction data, but relations between the DKM-based parameter kappa ("loss rate") and procedural variables (presentation modality) or individual characteristics (cognitive indices, age, sex) remained as yet unexplored. For that purpose, were-analyzed data from an earlier time reproduction study (N = 100), using visually or acoustically presented intervals of 1-5 sec. duration. Typical values of parameter kappa were approximately 0.03-0.04 sec.(-1), corresponding to relaxation times of internal "lossy integrators" of approximately 30 sec. Significant effects of presentation modality (smaller kappa values for the visual reproduction task) and of age (greater kappa in acoustic reproduction with increasing age) were observed. Cognitive variables (working memory, general fluid reasoning, attention) and sex of participants were not associated with kappa. Cognitive functions seem to play only a minor, if any, role at the level of time representation addressed by the DKM.

The unexpected return of mental clarity and memory shortly before death in patients suffering from severe psychiatric and neurologic disorders, which we have called "terminal lucidity", has been reported in the medical literature over the past 250 years, but has received little attention. We review a range of terminal lucidity cases in order to encourage investigation of the mechanisms involved and possible insights into both the neuroscience of memory and cognition at the end of life and treatment of terminal illness. These examples include case reports of patients suffering from brain abscesses, tumors, strokes, meningitis, dementia or Alzheimer's disease, schizophrenia, and affective disorders. Several of these accounts suggest that during terminal lucidity, memory and cognitive abilities may function by neurologic processes different from those of the normal brain. We expect that significant contributions to better understanding the processes involved in memory and cognition processing might be gained through in-depth studies of terminal lucidity. Studying terminal lucidity might also facilitate the development of novel therapies. In addition, increased awareness of unusual end-of-life experiences could help physicians, caregivers, and bereaved family members be prepared for encountering such experiences, and help those individuals cope with them.

Patients suffering from obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) are characterized by dysregulated neuronal processing of disorder-specific and also unspecific affective stimuli. In the present study, we investigated whether generic fear-inducing, disgust-inducing, and neutral stimuli can be decoded from brain patterns of single fMRI time samples of individual OCD patients and healthy controls. Furthermore, we tested whether differences in the underlying encoding provide information to classify subjects into groups (OCD patients or healthy controls). Two pattern classification analyses were conducted. In analysis 1, we used a classifier to decode the category of a currently viewed picture from extended fMRI patterns of single time samples (TR=3s) in individual subjects for several pairs of categories. In analysis 2, we used a searchlight approach to predict subjects' diagnostic status based on local brain patterns. In analysis 1, we obtained significant accuracies for the separation of fear-eliciting from neutral pictures in OCD patients and healthy controls. Separation of disgust-inducing from neutral pictures was significant in healthy controls. In analysis 2, we identified diagnostic information for the presence of OCD in the orbitofrontal cortex, and in the caudate nucleus. Accuracy obtained in these regions was 100% (p<10(-6)). To summarize our findings, by using multivariate pattern classification techniques we were able to identify neurobiological markers providing reliable diagnostic information about OCD. The classifier-based fMRI paradigms proposed here might be integrated in future diagnostic procedures and treatment concepts.