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During visual imagination, a perceptual representation is activated in the absence of sensory input. This is sometimes described as seeing with the mind's eye. A number of physiological studies indicate that the brain uses more or less the same neural resources for visual perception of sensory information and visual imagination. The intensity of visual imagination is typically assessed with questionnaires, while more objective measures are missing. Aim of the present study was, to test a new experimental paradigm that may allow to objectively quantify imagination. For this, we used priming and adaptation effects during observation of ambiguous figures. Our perception of an ambiguous stimulus is unstable and alternates spontaneously between two possible interpretations. If we first observe an unambiguous stimulus variant (the conditioning stimulus), the subsequently presented ambiguous stimulus can either be perceived in the same way as the test stimulus (priming effect) or in the opposite way (adaptation effect) as a function of the conditioning time. We tested for these conditioning effects (priming and adaptation) using an ambiguous Necker Cube and an ambiguous Letter /Number stimulus as test stimuli and unambiguous variants thereof as conditioning stimuli. In a second experimental condition, we tested whether the previous imagination of an unambiguous conditioning stimulus variant - instead of its observation - can have similar conditioning effects on the subsequent test stimulus. We found no systematic conditioning effect on the group level, neither for the two stimulus types (Necker Cube stimuli and Letter /Number stimuli) nor for the two conditions (Real and Imaginary). However, significant correlations between effects of Real and Imaginary Condition were observed for both stimulus types. The absence of conditioning effects at the group level may be explained by using only one conditioning time, which may fit with individual priming and adaptation constants of some of our participants but not of others. Our strong correlation results indicate that observers with clear conditioning effects have about the same type (priming or adaptation) and intensity of imaginary conditioning effects. As a consequence, not only past perceptual experiences but also past imaginations can influence our current percepts. This is further confirmation that the mechanisms underlying perception and imagination are similar. Our post-hoc qualitative observations from three self-defined aphantasic observers indicate that our paradigm may be a promising objective measure to identify aphantasia.

Current theories about visual perception assume that our perceptual system weights the a priori incomplete, noisy and ambiguous sensory information with previous, memorized perceptual experiences in order to construct stable and reliable percepts. These theories are supported by numerous experimental findings. Theories about precognition have an opposite point of view. They assume that information from the future can have influence on perception, thoughts, and behavior. Several experimental studies provide evidence for precognition effects, other studies found no such effects. One problem may be that the vast majority of precognition paradigms did not systematically control for potential effects from the perceptual history. In the present study, we presented ambiguous Necker cube stimuli and disambiguated cube variants and systematically tested in two separate experiments whether perception of a currently observed ambiguous Necker cube stimulus can be influenced by a disambiguated cube variant, presented in the immediate perceptual past (perceptual history effects) and/or in the immediate perceptual future (precognition effects). We found perceptual history effects, which partly depended on the length of the perceptual history trace but were independent of the perceptual future. Results from some individual participants suggest on the first glance a precognition pattern, but results from our second experiment make a perceptual history explanation more probable. On the group level, no precognition effects were statistically indicated. The perceptual history effects found in the present study are in confirmation with related studies from the literature. The precognition analysis revealed some interesting individual patterns, which however did not allow for general conclusions. Overall, the present study demonstrates that any future experiment about sensory or extrasensory perception urgently needs to control for potential perceptual history effects and that temporal aspects of stimulus presentation are of high relevance.

During the observation of an ambiguous figure our perception alternates between mutually exclusive interpretations, although the stimulus itself remains unchanged. The rate of these endogenous reversals has been discussed as reflecting basic aspects of endogenous brain dynamics. Recent evidence indicates that extensive meditation practice evokes long-term functional and anatomic changes in the brain, also affecting the endogenous brain dynamics. As one of several consequences the rate of perceptual reversals during ambiguous figure perception decreases. In the present study we compared EEG-correlates of endogenous reversals of ambiguous figures between meditators and non-meditating controls in order to better understand timing and brain locations of this altered endogenous brain dynamics. A well-established EEG paradigm was used to measure the neural processes underlying endogenous perceptual reversals of ambiguous figures with high temporal precision. We compared reversal-related ERPs between experienced meditators and non-meditating controls. For both groups we found highly similar chains of reversal-related ERPs, starting early in visual areas, therewith replicating previous findings from the literature. Meditators, however, showed an additional frontal ERP signature already 160 ms after stimulus onset (Frontal Negativity). We interpret the additional, meditation-specific ERP results as evidence that extensive meditation practice provides control of frontal brain areas over early sensory processing steps. This may allow meditators to overcome phylogenetically evolved perceptual and attentional processing automatisms.

BACKGROUND: The underlying neurobiological mechanisms that account for the onset and maintenance of binge-eating disorder (BED) are not sufficiently understood. This functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study explored the neural correlates of visually induced food reward and loathing. METHOD: Sixty-seven female participants assigned to one of four groups (overweight BED patients, overweight healthy control subjects, normal-weight healthy control subjects, and normal-weight patients with bulimia nervosa) participated in the experiment. After an overnight fast, the participants' brain activation was recorded during each of the following three conditions: visual exposure to high-caloric food, to disgust-inducing pictures, and to affectively neutral pictures. After the fMRI experiment, the participants rated the affective value of the pictures. RESULTS: Each of the groups experienced the food pictures as very pleasant. Relative to the neutral pictures, the visual food stimuli provoked increased activation in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and insula across all participants. The BED patients reported enhanced reward sensitivity and showed stronger medial OFC responses while viewing food pictures than all other groups. The bulimic patients displayed greater arousal, ACC activation, and insula activation than the other groups. Neural responses to the disgust-inducing pictures as well as trait disgust did not differ between the groups. CONCLUSIONS: This study provides first evidence of differential brain activation to visual food stimuli in patients suffering from BED and bulimia nervosa.

The aim of this fMRI study was to explore brain structures that are involved in the processing of erotic and disgust-inducing pictures. The stimuli were chosen to trigger approach and withdrawal tendencies, respectively. By adding sadomasochistic (SM) scenes to the design and examining 12 subjects with and 12 subjects without sadomasochistic preferences, we introduced a picture category that induced erotic pleasure in one sample and disgust in the other sample. Since we also presented neutral pictures, all subjects viewed pictures of four different categories: neutral, disgust-inducing, erotic, and SM erotic pictures. The analysis indicated that several brain structures are commonly involved in the processing of disgust-inducing and erotic pictures (occipital cortex, hippocampus, thalamus, and the amygdala). The ventral striatum was specifically activated when subjects saw highly sexually arousing pictures. This indicates the involvement of the human reward system during the processing of visual erotica.