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Current theories about visual perception assume that our perceptual system weights the a priori incomplete, noisy and ambiguous sensory information with previous, memorized perceptual experiences in order to construct stable and reliable percepts. These theories are supported by numerous experimental findings. Theories about precognition have an opposite point of view. They assume that information from the future can have influence on perception, thoughts, and behavior. Several experimental studies provide evidence for precognition effects, other studies found no such effects. One problem may be that the vast majority of precognition paradigms did not systematically control for potential effects from the perceptual history. In the present study, we presented ambiguous Necker cube stimuli and disambiguated cube variants and systematically tested in two separate experiments whether perception of a currently observed ambiguous Necker cube stimulus can be influenced by a disambiguated cube variant, presented in the immediate perceptual past (perceptual history effects) and/or in the immediate perceptual future (precognition effects). We found perceptual history effects, which partly depended on the length of the perceptual history trace but were independent of the perceptual future. Results from some individual participants suggest on the first glance a precognition pattern, but results from our second experiment make a perceptual history explanation more probable. On the group level, no precognition effects were statistically indicated. The perceptual history effects found in the present study are in confirmation with related studies from the literature. The precognition analysis revealed some interesting individual patterns, which however did not allow for general conclusions. Overall, the present study demonstrates that any future experiment about sensory or extrasensory perception urgently needs to control for potential perceptual history effects and that temporal aspects of stimulus presentation are of high relevance.

The information available through our senses is noisy, incomplete, and ambiguous. Our perceptual systems have to resolve this ambiguity to construct stable and reliable percepts. Previous EEG studies found large amplitude differences in two event-related potential (ERP) components 200 and 400 ms after stimulus onset when comparing ambiguous with disambiguated visual information ("ERP Ambiguity Effects"). These effects so far generalized across classical ambiguous figures from different visual categories at lower (geometry, motion) and intermediate (Gestalt perception) levels. The present study aimed to examine whether these ERP Effects are restricted to ambiguous figures or whether they also occur for different degrees of visibility. Smiley faces with low and high visibility of emotional expressions, as well as abstract figures with low and high visibility of a target curvature were presented. We thus compared ambiguity effects in geometric cube stimuli with visibility in emotional faces, and with visibility in abstract figures. ERP Effects were replicated for the geometric stimuli and very similar ERP Effects were found for stimuli with emotional face expressions but also for abstract figures. Conclusively, the ERP amplitude effects generalize across fundamentally different stimulus categories and show highly similar effects for different degrees of stimulus ambiguity and stimulus visibility. We postulate the existence of a high-level/meta-perceptual evaluation instance, beyond sensory details, that estimates the certainty of a perceptual decision. The ERP Effects may reflect differences in evaluation results.

A popular model for sensory processing, known as predictive coding, proposes that incoming signals are iteratively compared with top-down predictions along a hierarchical processing scheme. At each step, error signals arising from differences between actual input and prediction are forwarded and recurrently minimized by updating internal models to finally be "explained away". However, the neuronal mechanisms underlying such computations and their limitations in processing speed are largely unknown. Further, it remains unclear at which step of cortical processing prediction errors are explained away, if at all. In the present study, human subjects briefly viewed the superposition of two orthogonally oriented gratings followed by abrupt removal of one orientation after either 33 or 200 milliseconds. Instead of strictly seeing the remaining orientation, observers report rarely but highly significantly an illusory percept of the arithmetic difference between previous and actual orientations. Previous findings in cats using the identical paradigm suggest that such difference signals are inherited from first steps of visual cortical processing. In light of early modeling accounts of predictive coding, in which visual neurons were interpreted as residual error detectors signaling the difference between actual input and its temporal prediction based on past input, our data may indicate continued access to residual errors. Such strategy permits time-critical perceptual decision making across a spectrum of competing internal signals up to the highest levels of processing. Thus, the occasional appearance of a prediction error-like illusory percept may uncover maintained flexibility at perceptual decision stages when subjects cope with highly dynamic and ambiguous visual stimuli.

During the observation of an ambiguous figure our perception alternates between mutually exclusive interpretations, although the stimulus itself remains unchanged. The rate of these endogenous reversals has been discussed as reflecting basic aspects of endogenous brain dynamics. Recent evidence indicates that extensive meditation practice evokes long-term functional and anatomic changes in the brain, also affecting the endogenous brain dynamics. As one of several consequences the rate of perceptual reversals during ambiguous figure perception decreases. In the present study we compared EEG-correlates of endogenous reversals of ambiguous figures between meditators and non-meditating controls in order to better understand timing and brain locations of this altered endogenous brain dynamics. A well-established EEG paradigm was used to measure the neural processes underlying endogenous perceptual reversals of ambiguous figures with high temporal precision. We compared reversal-related ERPs between experienced meditators and non-meditating controls. For both groups we found highly similar chains of reversal-related ERPs, starting early in visual areas, therewith replicating previous findings from the literature. Meditators, however, showed an additional frontal ERP signature already 160 ms after stimulus onset (Frontal Negativity). We interpret the additional, meditation-specific ERP results as evidence that extensive meditation practice provides control of frontal brain areas over early sensory processing steps. This may allow meditators to overcome phylogenetically evolved perceptual and attentional processing automatisms.

AIM: The present study utilizes perceptual hysteresis effects to compare the ambiguity of Mona Lisa's emotional face expression (high-level ambiguity) and of geometric cube stimuli (low-level ambiguity). METHODS: In two experiments we presented series of nine Mona Lisa variants and nine cube variants. Stimulus ambiguity was manipulated by changing Mona Lisa's mouth curvature (Exp. 1) and the cubes' back-layer luminance (Exp. 2). Each experiment consisted of three conditions, two with opposite stimulus presentation sequences with increasing and decreasing degrees of ambiguity, respectively, and a third condition with a random presentation sequence. Participants indicated happy or sad face percepts (Exp. 1) and alternative 3D cube percepts (Exp. 2) by key presses. We studied the influences of a priori perceptual biases (long-term memory) and presentation order (short-term memory) on perception. RESULTS: Perception followed sigmoidal functions of the stimulus ambiguity morphing parameters. The morphing parameter for the functions' inflection points depended strongly on stimulus presentation order with similar effect sizes but different signs for the two stimulus types (positive hysteresis / priming for the cubes; negative hysteresis / adaptation for Mona Lisa). In the random conditions, the inflection points were located in the middle between those from the two directional conditions for the Mona Lisa stimuli. For the cube stimuli, they were superimposed on one sigmoidal function for the ordered condition. DISCUSSION: The hysteresis effects reflect the influence of short-term memory during the perceptual disambiguation of ambiguous sensory information. The effects for the two stimulus types are of similar size, explaining up to 34% of the perceptual variance introduced by the paradigm. We explain the qualitative difference between positive and negative hysteresis with adaptation for Mona Lisa and with priming for the cubes. In addition, the hysteresis paradigm allows a quantitative determination of the impact of adaptation and priming during the resolution of perceptual ambiguities. The asymmetric shifts of inflection points in the case of the cube stimuli is likely due to an a priori perceptual bias, reflecting an influence of long-term memory. Whether corresponding influences also exist for the Mona Lisa variants is so far unclear.

Perception of ambiguous figures is unstable and alternates repeatedly between possible interpretations. Some approaches to explaining this phenomenon have, so far, assumed low-level bottom-up mechanisms like adaptation and mutual inhibition of underlying neural assemblies. In contrast, less precise top-down approaches assume high-level attentional control mechanisms generalised across sensory modalities. In the current work we focused on specific aspects of the top-down approach. In a first study we used dwell times (periods of transiently stable percepts) and the parameters of dwell time distribution functions to compare the dynamics of perceptual alternations between visual (Necker cube) and auditory ambiguity (verbal transformation effect). In a second study we compared the endogenous alternation dynamics of the Necker cube with parameters from two attention tasks with different regimes of temporal dynamics. The first attention task (d2) is characterised by endogenous self-paced dynamics, similar to the dynamics underlying perceptual alternations of ambiguous figures, and we found clear correlations between dwell time parameters (Necker cube) and processing speed (d2 task). The temporal dynamics of the second (go/no-go) attention task, in contrast, are exogenously governed by the stimulus protocol, and we found no statistically significant correlation with the Necker cube data. Our results indicate that both perceptual instability and higher-level attentional tasks are linked to endogenous brain dynamics on a global coordinating level beyond sensory modalities.

This study addresses the controversy over how motor maps are organized during action simulation by examining whether action simulation states, that is, motor imagery and action observation, run on either effector-specific and/or action-specific motor maps. Subjects had to observe or imagine three types of movements effected by the right hand or the right foot with different action goals. The functional magnetic resonance imaging results showed an action-specific organization within premotor and posterior parietal areas of both hemispheres during action simulation, especially during action observation. There were also less pronounced effector-specific activation sites during both simulation processes. It is concluded that the premotor and parietal areas contain multiple motor maps rather than a single, continuous map of the body. The forms of simulation (observation, imagery), the task contexts (movements related to an object, with usual/unusual effector), and the underlying reason for performing the simulation (rate your subjective success afterwards) lead to the specific use of different representational motor maps within both regions. In our experimental setting, action-specific maps are dominant especially, during action observation, whereas effector-specific maps are recruited to only a lesser degree.

The perception of action is influenced by the observer's familiarity with its movement. However, how does motor familiarity with own movement patterns modulate the visual perception of action effects? Cortical activation was examined with fMRI while 20 observers were watching videotaped point-light displays of markers on the shoulders, the right elbow, and wrist of an opposing table tennis player. The racket and ball were not displayed. Participants were asked to predict the invisible effect of the stroke, that is, the ball flight direction. Different table tennis models were used without the observers knowing and being informed in advance that some of the presented videos displayed their own movements from earlier training sessions. Prediction had to be made irrespective of the identity of the player represented by the four moving markers. Results showed that participants performed better when observing their "own" strokes. Using a region-of-interest approach, fMRI data showed that observing own videos was accompanied by stronger activation (compared to other videos) in the left angular gyrus of the inferior parietal lobe and the anterior rostral medial frontal cortex. Other videos elicited stronger activation than own videos in the left intraparietal sulcus and right supramarginal gyrus. We suggest that during action observation of motorically familiar movements, the compatibility between the observed action and the observers' motor representation is already coded in the parietal angular gyrus--in addition to the paracingulate gyrus. The activation in angular gyrus is presumably part of an action-specific effect retrieval that accompanies actor-specific prefrontal processing. The intraparietal sulcus seems to be sensitive to incongruence between observed kinematics and internal model representations, and this also influences processing in the supramarginal gyrus.

Remembering something that has not in fact been experienced is commonly referred to as false memory. The Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm is a well-elaborated approach to this phenomenon. This study attempts to investigate the peripheral physiology of false memories induced in a visual DRM paradigm. The main research question is whether false recognition is different from true recognition in terms of accompanying physiological responses.Sixty subjects participated in the experiment, which included a study phase with visual scenes each showing a group of interrelated items in social contexts. Subjects were divided into an experimental group undergoing a classical DRM design and a control group without DRM manipulation. The control group was implemented in order to statistically control for possible biases produced by memorability differences between stimulus types. After a short retention interval, a pictorial recognition phase was conducted in the manner of a Concealed Information Test. Simultaneous recordings of electrodermal activity, respiration line length, phasic heart rate, and finger pulse waveform length were used. Results yielded a significant Group by Item Type interaction, showing that true recognition is accompanied by greater electrodermal activity than false recognition.Results are discussed in the light of Sokolov's Orienting Reflex, the Preliminary Process Theory and the Concealed Information Test. Implications and restrictions of the introduced design features are critically discussed. This study demonstrates the applicability of measures of peripheral physiology to the field of false memory research.

Ambiguous figures induce sudden transitions between rivaling percepts. We investigated electroencephalogram frequency modulations of accompanying change-related de- and rebinding processes. Presenting the stimuli discontinously, we synchronized perceptual reversals with stimulus onset, which served as a time reference for averaging. The resultant gain in temporal resolution revealed a sequence of time-frequency correlates of the reversal process. Most conspicuous was a transient right-hemispheric gamma modulation preceding endogenous reversals by at least 200 ms. No such modulation occurred with exogenously induced reversals of unambiguous stimulus variants. Post-onset components were delayed for ambiguous compared to unambiguous stimuli. The time course of oscillatory activity differed in several respects from predictions based on binding-related hypotheses. The gamma modulation preceding endogenous reversals may indicate an unstable brain state, ready to switch.

Analyses of neural mechanisms of duration processing are essential for the understanding of psychological phenomena which evolve in time. Different mechanisms are presumably responsible for the processing of shorter (below 500 ms) and longer (above 500 ms) events but have not yet been a subject of an investigation with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). In the present study, we show a greater involvement of several brain regions - including right-hemispheric midline structures and left-hemispheric lateral regions - in the processing of visual stimuli of shorter as compared to longer duration. We propose a greater involvement of lower-level cognitive mechanisms in the processing of shorter events as opposed to higher-level mechanisms of cognitive control involved in longer events.

Facilitated detection of threatening visual cues is thought to be adaptive. In theory, detection of threat cues should activate the amygdala independently from allocation of attention. However, previous studies using emotional facial expressions as well as phobic cues yielded contradictory results. We used fMRI to examine whether the allocation of attention to components of superimposed spider and bird displays modulates amygdala activation. Nineteen spider-phobic women were instructed to identify either a moving or a stationary animal in briefly presented double-exposure displays. Amygdala activation followed a dose-response relationship: Compared to congruent neutral displays (two birds), amygdala activation was most pronounced in response to congruent phobic displays (two spiders) and less but still significant in response to mixed displays (spider and bird) when attention was focused on the phobic component. When attention was focused on the neutral component, mixed displays did not result in significant amygdala activation. This was confirmed in a significant parametric graduation of the amygdala activation in the order of congruent phobic displays, mixed displays with attention focus on the spider, mixed displays with focus on the bird and congruent neutral displays. These results challenge the notion that amygdala activation in response to briefly presented phobic cues is independent from attention.

Although our eyes receive incomplete and ambiguous information, our perceptual system is usually able to successfully construct a stable representation of the world. In the case of ambiguous figures, however, perception is unstable, spontaneously alternating between equally possible outcomes. The present study compared EEG responses to ambiguous figures and their unambiguous variants. We found that slight figural changes, which turn ambiguous figures into unambiguous ones, lead to a dramatic difference in an ERP ("event-related potential") component at around 400 ms. This result was obtained across two different categories of figures, namely the geometric Necker cube stimulus and the semantic Old/Young Woman face stimulus. Our results fit well into the Bayesian inference concept, which models the evaluation of a perceptual interpretation's reliability for subsequent action planning. This process seems to be unconscious and the late EEG signature may be a correlate of the outcome.

If we observe an ambiguous figure, our percept is unstable and alternates between the possible interpretations. Periodically interrupting the presentation sizably modulates the spontaneous reversal rate. We here studied event-related potential (ERP) correlates of the neural processes underlying these strong modulations. An ambiguous Necker stimulus was presented discontinuously with four randomly varying interstimulus intervals (ISI; 14, 43, 130, 390 ms) while participants indicated perceptual reversals. EEG was selectively averaged with respect to the participants' percept and ISI. ERP traces varied markedly between ISIs. A simple model explained a major part of this variation and showed that the ISI-dependent ERP modulation occurs after disambiguation has already taken place. We suggest that perceptual stability (or reversal) depends on a system state, slowly changing from one reversal to the next. ISI can shift this state on a scale between stability and instability.